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The aim of this essay is to present the inherent barriers to the achievement of full co-
operative solutions to global environmental problems. It reviews the literature of 
Swanson, Barrett, Pearse and Helme to explain the problems associated with 
multilateral bargaining and to compare two types of bargaining, namely “ex-post” 
and “ex-ante”. It attempts to apply the theoretical guidelines on multilateral 
bargaining to GATT. 
 
 
PREFACE: 
 
The classic "Problem of the Commons" is associated with resources to which no 
property rights have been assigned.  These recourses are free to all who wish to avail 
of them.  Human nature being what it is, such resources will be overused.  This will 
ultimately threaten their existence if they are finite.  However, because of their nature 
agreement on the management of open-access resources is extremely unlikely.   
Because agreement on restraint by some users releases proportionately higher 
quantities of the "free" resource for use by non-agreeing parties, the latter will have an 
incentive to opportunism i.e. they will "free-ride".  Full co-operation becomes 
impossible in such a scenario except by outside intervention (government regulation, 
the courts).  But what of the "global commons"?  No international government exists 
to manage such resources as the environment, fish stocks in "open access" waters etc.  
The only alternative is to fashion agreements so as to ensure full co-operation by all 
the parties.  This, as we shall see, is no easy task. 
 
Finally "ex-ante" bargaining refers to a process which leads to simultaneous 
implementation of an agreement by all parties.  "Ex-post" bargaining arises when 
some parties defer agreement to a later date. (Pearse and Helme 1991). 
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Inherent Difficulties of Multilateral Bargaining: 
 
The general framework within which international law is instituted is as follows:  An 
multilateral conference is held from which an agreed text emerges.  This text, 
technically known  as a "convention" becomes law on ratification by a specified 
minimum number of countries. The convention remains open for signature by initially 
non-ratifying parties.  This introduces a problematical feature into multilateral 
bargaining  that of sequential accession, all parties are not simultaneously bound by 
the convention.  This leads to "ex-post" bargaining which, in the area of natural 
resources, theoretically means that although many countries may bind themselves to 
conservation, the overall effect on resource may not be diminished (or may be only 
partially diminished).  Thus the benefits of agreement to the acceding parties are 
nullified or eroded.  Conversely the costs of eventual agreement to non-acceding 
parties will be increased because they will then be giving up a greater share of the 
resource than would have been the case if they had been party to the original 
convention.  Effectively voluntary acceptance of constraints by some merely confers 
on others the right to appropriate a greater share of the resource. (Swanson 1991). 
 
For Swanson, the logic of the foregoing is that the first best option for any country is 
unrestricted maximisation while others accept constraints.  Individual incentives exist 
which only serve to drive the parties away from agreement.  This leads to the 
possibility of "free riding".  The more countries sign the convention the greater is the 
temptation to "free ride" because each successive acceptance increases the potential 
share of the resource for non-acceptors.  The optimal benefits would be conferred on 
the last country to sign.  We may well wonder why, given the foregoing, any country 
would voluntarily sign a convention.  The fact remains that they do for reasons 
ventured by Swanson (Helm and Pearce, 1991). 
 
Helm and Pearse (1991) considered the problem of states holding out by "free riding" 
as a result of the combination of open access resources and the sequential nature of 
acceptance of international conventions.  There exists another cause of holdouts (not 
entirely separable from the first), namely "heterogeneous parties".  In essence, 
because all states are not uniformly affected by decisions on resources (for instance, 
in the case of acid rain, states upwind of emissions have less to gain from reductions 
than downwind or peripheral states or the denial of full access to a resource may be a 
greater burden on some countries due to a lack of substitutes) any attempt to obtain 
agreement on uniform standards will fail. 
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Comparison Between "Ex-Post" and "Ex-Ante" bargaining: 
 
Historically sequential accessions to international conventions has been the norm.  
Early ratification by a majority of countries has led to the creation of "customary law" 
(i.e. the accepted practice for those countries) which can exert moral pressure on 
dissenting countries but lacks real teeth.  Some of the weaknesses of the "ex-post" 
bargaining occasioned by sequential accessions and discussed in Helm and Pearse 
may be enumerated. 
 
(1) Delayed full implementation of action on resources leads to irretrievable loss 
of that portion of the resource which is used up by "free riders" in the interim.  In the 
extreme there may be extinction of the resource.  Both effects have dire implications 
for future generations. 
 
(2) "Agreed" laws become subject to unilateral restructuring either by way of 
reservation/derogation (explicit disagreement) or by tacit disagreement, whereby an 
apparently consenting country unilaterally ignores the provisions of the contract.  This 
leads to the common perception of international laws as being ineffective. 
 
(3) Conventions are often more formal than substantial.  To achieve nominal 
"consensus" the text is often imprecise to accommodate the viewpoints of the various 
parties.  Such conventions may degenerate into mere aspirations leading to wholesale 
breakdown in implementation.  This further discredits international law. (Helme and 
Pearce 1991). 
 
In sum the spectre of holdout (via "free riding" or heterogeneity ) haunts all sequential 
accessions. 
 
"Ex -Ante" bargaining  -  Why it has failed. 
 
According to Swanson (1991) binding enforceable "ex-ante" agreements require the 
following components: 
 
(i) An effective monitoring system; 
(ii) Objective optimal usage level; 
(iii) Sanctions to deter non-compliance; 
(iv) Meaningful share allocations. 
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(i) Monitoring: 
Parties to the agreement need to be assured that they are getting their full benefits.  
This can only be achieved by  being able to verify that all others are complying.  Self-
implementation will not satisfy this requirement.  Even if carried out scrupulously, 
there is no observable return to the participating countries.  The only satisfactory 
solution is the institution of an independent international monitoring agency.  This 
should be done "ex-ante" as part of the convention. 
 
(ii) Optimal Usage Level: 
Independent scientific opinions on aggregate optimal usage of the resource should be 
accepted "ex-ante"  The tendency is for greater users of the resource to produce their 
own "scientific" evidence of acceptable aggregate usage because their pro-rata 
allocation will increase with any increase in total usage.  This leads to less benefits to 
others due to the depletion of the resource. 
 
(iii) Sanctions: 
As there is no global authority to enforce agreements such as exist in individual 
countries (e.g. judiciary and police) enforcement must form part of the convention.  
Agreement on methods of enforcement is not enough on its own, performance 
thereafter must be provided for.  This can be done by allocating meaningful shares, 
setting a time frame for the implementation of such allocations, and crucially, 
instituting a bond system to guarantee enforcement.  If this is not achieved in "ex-ante' 
bargaining, the dynamics of changing conditions will cause contracting countries to 
alter their perceptions of the original distribution of shares and will lead ultimately to 
the collapse of the agreement. (Swanson 1991). 
 
 (iv) Realistic Shares: 
Uniform shares:  Equal access for all to open access global resources appeals to a 
sense of fairness.  However as all countries are not equal this approach will merely 
institutionalise the disparity between rich and poor.  As there is no international 
representative forum, the interests of the weaker parties cannot be protected, as is the 
case in democracies where the political process simplifies the relationships between 
heterogeneous groups through a representative system. (Swanson 1991). 
 
Non-uniform shares:   The allocation of meaningful shares in global multilateral 
bargaining is extremely complex.  To overcome the problem of handouts highly 
technical formulae are required to differentiate between individual countries' burdens 
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(which are not uniformly distributed due to heterogeneity) and the benefits conferred 
on them by "free riding".  Countries have incentives to distort information on the 
effects of agreement on them.  Until this problem is solved "ex-ante" bargaining will 
fail. (Swanson 1991). 
 
Scientific measurement of meaningful shares:  Scientific committees with 
representative appointments and majority voting are seen as a possibility of 
introducing elements of representative government at international level. 
 
Allocation by prior appropriation:  A baseline date is established.  Countries are then 
allocated shares based on their usage of the resource on that date.  Again this would 
institutionalise the gap between developed and developing countries and would 
accordingly fail. 
 
Swanson concludes that "ex-ante" bargaining is preferable to "ex-post" bargaining 
because while both involve high costs, the benefits from the former are available at an 
earlier date.  This is significant when considering environmental resources.  The 
longer the delay the more of the environmental "cake" is eaten.  The eaten portion is 
foregone forever and future generations suffer from this loss. 
 
(iii) GATT as an Example of "Ex-Ante" Bargaining. 
 
The purpose of the W.T.O (and previously GATT) is to reduce unfair competition by, 
inter alia, ensuring international parity of tariffs and controlling of "dumping" of low 
cost goods.  Any application or reduction in tariffs by any group of countries must be 
reciprocated by all countries.  In theory this is equal treatment for all.  This would be 
fine if all contracting countries were equal, but this is patently not so.  Developing 
countries lack the bargaining power of the developed countries, because the former's 
products lack the range and complexity of the latter's.  While imports of raw materials 
into the developed world are subject to low tariffs (2% for Malaysian palm oil into the 
E.C.), the tariffs on value-added products are prohibitively high (25% on margarine 
from Malaysia).  Thus developed countries are assured of a permanent supply of raw 
materials at the expense of the poorer countries (only 9% of the market price of 
timber products goes to Third World Countries suppliers). 
 
Furthermore, the final intention of GATT, subject to agreement, is the institution of a 
Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO) which will subsume GATT rules and will 
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have wide powers of enforcement including the power to over-ride national 
legislation which is inconsistent with former GATT rules. 
 
GATT and MTO contain within them many of the elements which Swanson would 
consider desirable for successful contracts based on "ex-ante" bargaining i.e. 
universally binding, proper monitoring by way of reciprocal actions, the ultimate 
sanction of MTO intervention.  Nonetheless one is left to ponder the wisdom of Third 
World parties to GATT in agreeing to a convention that is so obviously biased against 
them.  Allocation of shares of the economic "cake" have been based on the principle 
of prior appropriation which should have militated against its acceptance by countries 
which were poorer to start with.  Any possibility of "ex-post" bargaining to improve 
their lot is precluded by the provision for reciprocal action by others to maintain the 
tariff status quo.  Could it be that Swanson has overlooked a vital ingredient of all 
"ex-ante" bargaining, the relevant strengths (economic or even military) of the 
bargaining parties? 
 
SUMMARY: 
 
Examples abound in several areas of international agreement of the barriers to the 
attainment of full international  co-operation.  In the light of  
what Swanson has to say about "free riding" Ireland's neutrality takes on an aspect of 
virtuosity rather than virtuousness!  Although not party to military conventions for 
mutual defence, we nevertheless enjoy de facto benefits of protection by virtue of our 
membership of the E.C. Qualifications, by way of derogations abound in EC law thus 
diluting the full co-operation ideal.  Historically we have seen the ultimate in "free 
riding" when several countries opted for neutrality at the outset of World War 2 only 
to declare war on Germany when that country was obviously facing defeat.  Thus they 
hoped to share in the benefits of victory while avoiding the costs of participation.  At 
the micro-level the current peace process can be seen as analogous to sequential 
accession.  The peace process has been instituted by the Downing Street Declaration 
(an implicitly multilateral convention).  It has been left open to Sinn  Fein to "ratify" 
this convention by persuading the IRA to forego violence.  Benefits  will then become 
available to Sinn Fein in the form of a possible allocation of shares in the political 
process.  It would seem that Sinn Fein perceive themselves as    benefiting politically 
at the expense of others by postponing acceptance of the terms of the agreement.  
Because simultaneous acceptance of the Declaration was not politically possible, Sinn 
Fein have been given the opportunity to become "free riders" by gaining benefits now 
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and holding out for even greater benefits in "ex-post" bargaining (which is effectively  
going on at present). 
 
Multilateral bargaining is bedevilled by the complexity of motives and by technical 
difficulties.  Incentives always exist which drive parties away from a full co-operative 
solution to global problems.  To change the orientation of incentives is the greatest 
difficulty associated with any effort to solve the world's environmental problems. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
T,.M. Swanson (1991),  "The Regulation of Oceanic Resources"  in Dieter Helm (Ed.)  
"Economic Policy Towards the Environment"  Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
 
Scott Barrett  (1991),   "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection",  Ibid. 
 
Neil Midleton (1993),  Pre-publication extract in "Irish Times" of "The Tears of the 
Crocodile:  From Rio to Reality in the Developing World:,  Pluto Press. 
 
 
 
